North Dakota Law Review
Volume 39

Number 1

Article 14

1963

Book Reviews
Ervin H. Pollack
Clarence Manion
Stanley E. Dadisman
John F. Stone
Robert P. Gust

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pollack, Ervin H.; Manion, Clarence; Dadisman, Stanley E.; Stone, John F.; and Gust, Robert P. (1963) "Book
Reviews," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 39 : No. 1 , Article 14.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol39/iss1/14

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE. By Karl N. Llewellyn. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962. 531 pages. $8.95.
Writing a review about a posthumously published book is
difficult since the atmosphere is understandably infused with
sentiment and feeling. One's tendency is to write with generous restraint and marked respect, avoiding polemics and
issues. However, Karl Llewellyn reflected little restraint and
sentiment in his academic pursuits and, whatever the circumstance, would not have liked them applied professionally to
him and his works. He would have wanted a reviewer of this,
his last book, to ride his charge as he did, straight for the
brush and the bramble bushes.
Although we might be-inclined toward this view, are we at
this time capable of objectively evaluating Llewellyn's jurisprudential thoughts? Are we not presently too close and too
much a part of them for intelligent appraisement and proper
assessment? Is it not more fitting th at we leave such careful
evaluation for the later time when we are not stirred by feeling, form or setting? Suffice it, therefore, to acknowledge
that this review will be more expositive than the situation
would ordinarily warrant.
In his introduction, Professor Llewellyn notes that the
book is not a general collection or a selection of representative articles. Instead, it asserts a unital theme of Jurisprudence, Llewellyn's brand of American legal realism.
Structurally, the book is divided into four main sections:
(1) realism; (2) institution, rules and craft; (3) controlling
behavior: how and why; and (4) men.
The first unit consists of such well-known jurisprudential
articles as "Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step" and
"Some Realism about Realism."
The second division is more discursive, covering a wider
range of less familiar topics, such as, "The Bar's Troubles,
and Poultices-and Cures ?," "Law and the Social SciencesEspecially Sociology," and "The Study of Law as a Liberal
Art."
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"Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement," "The Anthropology of Criminal Guilt," and "What Law Cannot Do for
Inter-Racial Peace" are examples of the articles contained in
the third division.
Llewellyn's tributes of Hohfeld, Pound, and Holmes conclude the volume.
The range of the papers is even wider than this sampling
suggests. The book, as noted, includes some of his less known
articles, which cover such subjects as the significance to
Jurisprudence of intensive study of the crafts and of craftsmanship, analytical evaluation of the nature of an institution
and of its functions, and an introduction to the study of
legal esthetics. Llewellyn's work, as distinguished from that
of some other realists, gives prominence to psychological
theories of the judicial process and to the function of intuitive, albeit artistic, preceptions in the law.
Llewellyn regrets two lacks in the coverage of the book.
Firstly, there is no considered development of the theory of
Justice, which he interstitially views as being not an attainable
or definable subject but a quest. He admits that the concept
of Justice is determined initially by each quester's view of
the Universe and secondly by the essence of scarcity, a disparity created by the world's inability to satisfy justified desires and demands.
The second omission which he enumerates is a paper which
would explore the need in the "criminal" field for a real
double standard. By this he means a standard for the individual, a criterion of total personal responsibility, juxtaposed to a standard for the legislator or administrator which
pertains to the offender. He sees the latter policy as being
largely affected by genetic' forces and social conditioning.
Realism developed as a movement in the United States,
where, influenced by our pluralistic setting, the discrepancies between the law in action and in theory are easily recognizable. Law is viewed in relation to social ends, as Llewellyn
explains, but its shadow is cast behind and not in front of
the institutions it controls. Realism's distrust of traditional
legal rules, to the extent that they describe what the courts
really do, is well-known. To reduce this uncertainty, certain
procedures are recommended by the realists. With this ob-
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jective in mind, Llewellyn dresses his methodology in new
terminology and word-symbols, such as "law-government,"
"law-jobs" and "law-stuff."
It is characteristic of Llewellyn that he functionally applies these new labels to institutions and to his study of some
legal subjects, such as commercial law. However, he does not
approach all substantive concepts with the same rapier movement. For example, although he recognizes the distinction
between substantive, derivative and moral rights under behavioral and legal analysis, he makes no semantic distinctions
which would avoid possible confusion in the descriptive use
of the general term "right" (p. 21). Perhaps here, where
radical departures seem most needed, his writing displays
recognizable orthodoxy and standard description. One even
detects this same conformity and conventionality beneath a
florid, dramatic style in his Common Law Tradition.
However, the reader should not be misled into thinking
that Llewellyn is primarily concerned with definition, because he is not. To illustrate, he objects to circumscribing the
law to peripheral limits by defining "it" (law). As he sees
the issue, the ever-increasing emphasis is on observable behavior with ever-decreasing emphasis on words. Thus he
includes in the field of law "everything currently included, and
a vast deal more" (p. 40).
Llewellyn is sensitive to beauty in the law, but he sees
beauty as either slighted or distorted. For him, law's beauty
extends beyond its literary counterpart, the turn of phrase or
imagery. This he sees as being in bold isolation of the social
moorings to which the words are attached. Thus, Llewellyn
identifies, as Pound distinguished them, three style-periods
in legal writing, reflecting predominant social influences. In
the formative era, the later 1830's and earlier 1840's, authors
possessed a vigorous style in coping with new developments
requiring strength of purpose. Legal writing in that period
had the flare of the Gothic-in-growth. The next style in our
legal order is characterized by authoritarian, formal, logical
manifestations in the period of "maturity of law."
A third style prevails today, mirroring the complexities
of modern life, the inadequacies of the earlier legal techniques
to meet with problems, and a range of other factors. The
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essential feature in the new style is a conscious, patent concern with policy (p. 188).
Llewellyn cautions that he is not proposing the exaggerations and extremes of "functionalists" in architecture
who consider no form or ornament to be esthetically acceptable which is not a working portion of the object. In this
reviewer's opinion, he correctly identifies functional esthetics
with purpose so that "whatever expresses purpose expresses
also an inherent part of function." To this end, the Gothic
cathedral, sculpture and glass painting, while structurally unessential, satisfy a function as well as man's love of beauty.
The counterpart of this analysis by Llewellyn relates to
the Good in Law (p. 197). He identifies the crucial question
as that of the ethical or moral neutrality of the inevitable
and of the impossible. This, of course, requires elucidation.
In law, the inevitable and the impossible are identified by
him as ethically neutral, "as setting given conditions and given
limits of action." Work in law is encompassed by limited
ranges of conduct. To the judge, the Good is circumscribed
by the need to stay within the limits of his official duties.
Good, as it relates to legislators, is limited by their duty to the
Constitution. However, this description by Llewellyn of the
limitations of judicial and legislative conduct relates to process and provides no basis for the choices we make in law.
To that extent his formulations are of no direct utility in
identifying or implementing the Good.
The criminal lawyer and sociologist will find of special
interest his discussion on behavioral control. Llewellyn identifies the conflict between law observance and law enforcement as centering around three basic propositions: (1) that
law observance is a matter of the formation of folkways
rather than being a question of legal rules, (2) that law and
folkways constitute varieties and specifics in accordance with
group and other interests and (3) that for group control,
the issue of law enforcement is directed at individuals whose
conduct is affected or altered. In essence, he views law observance dimly. He conceives of law enforcement as a technical problem of inducing law observance which he says is
impossible. He sees society as consisting of numerous groups
and individuals as group members, each embracing group
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folkways "in block," whereas societal concern is in reeducating dislocated persons. He is content to leave undisturbed the economic and cultural schemata which create
artificial desires and frustrations in individuals. Llewellyn
concludes that repressive measures of control are mere temporary expedients, whose weakness rests in the very affectiveness of the instrument used. Finally, law, as seen by him,
is not a good but an evil-"a thing to regret" (pp. 399-400).
The latter concept is derived from the Lockeian doctrine
that government, even minimum government, is evil. Here
Professor Llewellyn stops short of observable truth, as other
philosophers have done, by intermingling fact with preference.
To describe the law as either good or bad, in this context, is
a departure from realism.
This pronouncement by Llewellyn, which identifies law
as a prescriptive control, also fails to take into account the
vast range of technical and generative law of modern society
whose primary functions are either to provide ordered system or to implement social policy. To this extent, the law
transcends the rudiments of force and prohibition and assumes helpful and ameliorative roles. Therefore to describe
it solely in relation to its prescriptive elements is to ignore or
to overlook its broadened scope.
When the Karl Llewellyn philosophical story finally is
told, the degree of his conformity to social and legal processes will be significant. Nonetheless, his philosophy contains much originality and is singularly provocative. In vouchsafing recognizable patterns in human behavior and relating legal control to them, rather than the opposite, he emphasizes the primacy of institutions. In the final analysis, one
can predict that he will be ranked among the foremost legal
thinkers of this generation.
ERVIN H. POLLACK*

*
Professor of Law and Director of Research Services, College of Law,
The Ohio State University. Author, BRANDEIS READER (1956), FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH, (2d ed. 1962), and other books and
periodical articles.
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THE COMMITTEE AND ITS CRITICS. By William F.
Buckley, Jr. and the Editors of National Review. New York:
G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1962, 352 Pages. $4.95.
This book is what its eleven authors say it is, namely, a
calm review of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The main task of any intelligent discussion of this controversial subject is to keep it "calm." These editors of National Review have done that and the end result is a valuable
and informative volume that should be readily available to all
people, and particularly to college students who wish to
think as well as talk about Congressional investigations of
Communism.
William F. Buckley, Jr., Editor of National Review and
ten of his editorial colleagues have each described and evaluated a part of the accomplishments, practices, projects and
general history of the Committee's work since 1945. The
main criticisms of the Committee are carefully considered and
balanced against the conditions as well as the theories with
which the Committee must contend. The investigating Congressmen are given their day in court and so too are their
critics. The verdict for the Committee is unanimous but
there are cautionary and remedial remonstrances for the improvement and expedition of future hearings which are
friendly but nevertheless firm. All in all, the authors have
planted a crop of truth in an area that has become a weed
patch of deliberate misrepresentation.
In the last ten years, due to the apathetic indifference of
the patriotic public and the epithetic cunning of the Communists, the words "House Committee on Un-American Activities" have been fashioned into a firecracker of emotion
designed to explode in the face of any public speaker who
deigned to speak of freedom in the general context of antiCommunism. This tactic has been employed most effectively
on college campuses where the jeer leaders are trained to lead
their howling squads into noisy ridicule whenever a speaker
dares to say a good word about Congressional investigations
of Communist activity.
In my own college days, Woodrow Wilson once said to me
and others present that attempts to refute emotions with
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logical argumentation would serve merely to deepen misunderstanding on all sides. Since they are psychological rather
than logical, emotions are not refutable. Fact and argument
simply serve to enflame the emotions to which they are directed. The people whose vital interest it is to deride the H.U.A.C.
know this very well indeed. They manage, therefore, to load
all discussion of the Committee with combustible materials of
hate, fear and blind prejudice. The resulting smoke chokes off
reason and obscures whatever logical point has been involved.
The emotional flares that go up immediately when the
H.U.A.C. is discussed picture "free speech," "freedom of association" and the "right of privacy" as all under siege by
the tyrannical inquisitors of the all-powerful state. The ironic
fact that these rockets are fabricated by the agents of the
most tyrannical all-powerful force in history, namely, Communism, is well obscured by the time they are passed into the
hands of the naive innocents who fire them at anti-Communist
speakers. The targets are thus immediately on the defensive
as agents of the evil force they are trying, in fact, to destory.
Appropriately, therefore, in the first chapter of the subject book, William F. Buckley, Jr., makes haste to say:
"another premise shared by the contributors to this volume
is this; that the state wants constant watching because it is,
notoriously, the principal instrument for the oppression of
free men... The contributors to this volume ... have in recent years resisted with a consistency they would match up
against that of any other half-dozen persons, the accumulation of power in the Government of the United States. Their
deliberations on the matter of the H.U.A.C. should be viewed
in this light. We are, every one of us, disposed to resist the
accumulation by the state of any power which is unnecessary
to the insurance, by reasonable measures, of the survival of
our society. "
It is precisely with the survival of our free society that the
H.U.A.C. is concerned.
Emotional flares to one side, what the Communists have
induced the impassioned critics of the Committee to contend
for is the right of Communist agents to infiltrate American
institutions, including the Government and its defense establishment, without danger of their exposure as object lessons calling for more adequate legislation to shore up the
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defenses of our nation in time of war. This fact of our present
war to the death with Communism has been declared repeatedly by J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, to whom many critics of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee would assign all of our concern over the alleged menace of Communism.1 Congress has
found, as a matter of fact, and the Supreme Court has finally
affirmed that Communism is a clear and present danger to
the safety of the country.2 In war as it is fought by the Communists, the detection and exposure of subversion is the first
requisite of national defense. Without the House Un-American
Activities Committee, the disclosures that it has made, and
the alarms that it has sounded since 1945, the state of our
defenses, bad as they are now, would be immeasurably worse.
"It is nothing short of preposterous willingly to tolerate an
active conspiracy in our midst, and if the Constitution is not,
as presently understood, resilient enough to cope with the
contemporary requirements of survival, then the Constitution
should be modified, as it has been before." (p. 33).
CLARENCE MANION*

MANUAL CONCERNING LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR
THE LAW STENOGRAPHER WITH INSTRUCTIONS
AND SAMPLE FORMS. By Evangeline Sletwold. Chicago:
3
The Burdette Smith Co., 2d ed., 1961, 133 Pages. $7.00.
A chart and compass, a level and square, a pitch pipe, a
slide rule, and litmus paper illustrate the many tools and
devices which promptly, usefully and accurately guide mankind toward accomplishment of certain missions. They are
reliable, conveniently available, and immediately responsive.
So, too, does Miss Evangeline Sletwold's Manual Concerning Legal Documents for the Law Stenographer with Instruction and Sample Forms serve these functions and fulfill these
Speech of J. Edgar Hoover to the American Legion Convention in
1.
Las Vegas, Nevada, October, 1962.
2. Communist Party of the United States, v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 7 (1960).
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, 1924-41; Dean, 1941-1952;
presently attorney at law, South Bend, Indiana.
3.

The Burdette Smith Co., 111 W. Washington St., Chicago 2, Illinois.
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needs in the law office and in the world of the law stenographer.
The second edition of Miss Sletwold's Manual, published
after more than ten year's experience in the use of the original publication, reflects maturity, poise and character. It is
compact-eight and one-half by eleven inches in size and
plastic ring-bound-small enough to be handily used but big
enough to contain the essential "know how" and "show how"
materials for practically every work demand of the legal
stenographer. Obviously the book embodies years of practical
law office and teaching experience and much reflective study.
No wasted space will be found in the eighteen chapters. Even
the Preface is informative and instructive and the thirteenpage index is a real guide to the Manual's contents.
Although the Manual finds many of its roots in the fertile
soil of Illinois and Chicago law practice, it has a broad and
expansive reach and sweep, useful in any law office in the
country. A practical lawyer's examination of the book from
the General Information-Reference Books in Chapter I
through the Helps in Chapter XVII1 will convincingly unfold
the kind of practical materials every stenographer must know
in order to produce good law office work products. The author
not only manifests the "know how" but displays clearly the
"show how" in understandable forms and language. Chapter
III, for example, on Typing Instructions for Documents, and
Chapter XV on Typing Briefs illustrate, explain and simplify many of the problems which are stumbling blocks to the
learning legal stenographer and as well to the younger learning lawyer. The eighteen chapters may not provide all of the
answers to all law office problems for all legal stenographers,
but they obviously provide practical answers for most of the
problems confronting most of the stenographers in today's
law offices. An experienced senior legal secretary or stenographer may be irreplaceable and indispensable, but Miss Sletwold's Manual will be a most useful substitute when the senior
secretary must be away.
The 1962 American Bar Association's The Lawyer's Handbook comments that "Many lawyers complain that they cannot find a highly competent legal secretary." Over two hundred years ago Poor Richard is reported to have written that
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"God helps them that help themselves." One of the best ways
for a lawyer to help himself to have a competent legal secretary is to have within his stenographer's ready reach a copy
of Miss Sletwold's Manual for the Law Stenographer.
STANLEY

E.

DADISMAN*

LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS. By William J. Bryan,
Jr., M. D.1 Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1962. 282 Pages.
Dr. Bryan has the distinction of publishing the first book
which covers completely the legal aspects of hypnotism. It is
an apparently well researched book, besides being well written, and the author has succeeded in explaining the concept
of legal hypnosis as well as illustrating its many practical
uses in the field of law.
In the introductory chapter the author points up that
hypnosis is an "extension of concentration of the mind", (p.
5), and by its application it is possible to ascertain not only
what the mind is subconsciously concentrated on, but further
to direct the concentration to a particular matter (the latter
applied with caution depending on the subject). By analogy
the principles of hypnosis and suggestion are used in the
advertising business, in religion,1 and even in court rooms
since it must be admitted that no successful trial lawyer will
attempt to influence a jury solely by means of reasoning
processes alone, but will employ emotional argument since
"emotion concentrates the mind." (p. 7)
Next the author discusses legislation which has evolved to
regulate hypnosis. One of the first statutes enacted to control hypnotism was passed in England, and this was aimed
primarily at stage hypnotism.2 There are some state statutes
recognizing the use of hypnosis in medicine and dentistry,
but the author feels that with the "coming of age of hypnosis as a medical tchnique" there is a need for clarifying
a

Of the West Virginia Bar, counsel with a Charleston, West Virginia

la
firm; Professor of law at the College of Law, West Virginia University. Morgantown, West Virginia.
t
Fellow, Past President, and Executive Director American Institute
of Hypnosis, Los Angeles, California.
1.
See WILLIAM J. BRYAN, JR., RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS,
1962.
2. Great Britain's Hypnotism Act. 1952.
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legislation to establish rules for meeting the real legal problems involved in hypnosis. An extensive section is devoted
to a discussion of "Previous Court Decisions On Hypnosis."
3
The author treats in full an American Law Reports article,
and then discusses many previous court decisions, starting
as early as the 1600's to the present time. The earlier cases
uniformly rejected evidence derived from hypnosis, drugs
or other medical techniques. Evidence obtained through hypnosis is still rejected today, 4 while other medically obtained
evidence, including that derived from drugs, may, at least
in some jurisdictions, be admitted where it is not offered for
the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted.5 The
author feels that this same test should be applied to statements taken under the state of hypnosis, since hypno-analysis
is a medical technique similar to "truth serums", "sodium
pentathol, or other medical devices." (p. 73)
Dr. Bryan devotes 75 pages to the detailed analysis of a
psycho-killer. This was an actual case in which he was involved in California, and in which the trial court refused to
allow him to testify as to his opinion of the defendant's sanity, when the "opinion (was) based in part on an examination
conducted while the patient was in a hypnotic trance." (p.
152) The author has in detail very convincingly treated the
case history of this defendant, and the results of these medicalhypnotic tests indicate that the subject-defendant may have
been mentally insane at the time he committed the murders.
Without the benefit of this opinion testimony the jury brought
in the death sentence. The Supreme Court automatically reviewed the case, but refused to reverse the conviction on the
above evidentiary question.6 If Dr. Bryan's diagnosis is correct, one wonders whether all of the pertinent facts were given to the jury so that they could mete ouIt proper justice.
One chapter discusses hypnosis and crime and covers both
crimes committed on hypnotic subjects, and crimes corn3.
Annot. "Physiological and Psychological Truth and Deception Tests",
23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
4.
But ef. Cornell v. Superior Court. 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959),
where in a landmark case the court decided that the defendant's right to
counsel includes the right to be hypnotized for the purpose of calling forth
facts which the defendant is unable to recall because of retrograde am-'

nesia.
5.
6.

See People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
People v. Bush, 16 Cal. Rpt. 898, 366 P.2d 314 (1961).
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mitted by hypnotic subjects. Several famous cases are raised
in detail discussing alleged sex offenses. The conclusion points
up that hypnosis is generally a poor device to use in committing any sort of crime. Another chapter is devoted to "Winning Cases Through Hypnosis", in which possible ways of
using hypnosis in general law practice are discussed. A sampling of the areas covered includes: the relaxation of the nervous witness; the use of hypnosis in retrograde amnesia; improving faulty memory through hypnosis; and influencing
the jury by means of hypnotic techniques (this is not advised,
but is discussed since a degree of hypnosis is used whenever
an emotional situation is created). Each of these sections is
thoroughly covered and illustrated by actual experiences and
cases.
The use of hypnosis in law enforcement is treated in two
sections: safety and the interrogation of criminals with hypnosis. There is a chapter on "International Law and Hypnosis" in which "brainwashing" and "powerization" are discussed. The latter term was devised by Dr. Bryan after the
recent U-2 incident, and is distinguished from brainwashing in that there is emotional rather than physical intimidation, which can bring about a complete change in the "victim's mentality and emotional structure". (p. 256-58)
The author concludes the book with a short chapter on the
use of hypnosis in penal institutions and another on mass
hypnotism. The last chapter illustrates how hypnotic devices
may be used by world leaders and politicians.
This book is extremely interesting reading, and though
it is not an exhaustive coverage of the legal problems of
hypnosis, it is comprehensive and will serve to stimulate
thought on the legal- aspects of hypnotism. The book is recommended to all lawyers, politicians all levels of law enforcement officers, judges and laymen. It is recommended particularly to the layman, for in Dr. Bryan's words: "Once
the 'average man' understands something of the true facts
concerning the phenomena of hypnosis, the law which regulates and protects him must follow in turn, both recognizing
and utilizing the value of medical hypnosis for the betterment of our people." (p. xvii)
JOHN

F. STONE
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FACTORS OF GROWTH IN A LAW PRACTICE. By Roy
A. Redfield. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1962. 248
pages.
The author's main purpose in this work is to discuss the
ramifications of a successful law practice and present suggestions for expanding and improving the quality of a law
practice.
Initially he discusses some attributes necessary to success
in law, among which are clarity of expression, appreciation of
legal reasoning, and industry. He goes on to discuss partnerships in contrast to the lone practice; giving as advantages of
the partnership the following: greater volume, opportunity
for consultation, continuity of the firm, plus greater income.
Chapters three through eleven deal with the manner whereby a law practice may be improved. The author states that
the most significant clientage is that resulting from commercial and business connections. He continues that the
lawyer must continually be aware of the need to build up
the volume of business in order to become more selective in
accepting work. Specific ways in which to increase a lawyer's
acquaintances are through social contacts, such as civic groups
where the people associated with may well become recommenders, although not clients themselves.
Reputation as the most important factor is discussed in
terms of professional excellence and personality. The author
suggests public speaking as an excellent means of promoting
oneself in the law profession if the lawyer has the ability and
desire to do so. Not to be forgotten is the wife who through
her own social acquaintances can make new contacts for
her husband and help further his acquaintances and friendships. A conclusion drawn at this point is that the promotion of a law practice can be successfully done only through
the lawyer's own presence and personality. Services assisting
the lawyer such as listings and ratings are discussed as necessary aids in today's complex and fast moving society. Reference is made to the Bar as a partially controlled monopoly,
which nonetheless is overcrowded, permitting many to eke
out only a meager living.
In chapter twelve Mr. Redfield considers the improving
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climate of public opinion toward the Bar. He cites the services
performed by the "Legal Aid" and "Lawyer's Referral Service" of great value in promoting the standing of the Bar, in
addition to creating contact with lawyers by the public.
Chapters thirteen through fifteen deal with somewhat different factors in the development of a law practice than those
mentioned earlier. Specialization is discussed as a more significant thing today than in the past, although limited according to a few general types, and limited primarily to metropolitan centers. The advantages of less time required and
greater income from specialization are considered. Taxation
is mentioned as an increasingly important field of specialization for which a demand exists. The author contends that
politics and the practice of law do not ordinarily mix well.
The public tends to think of one engaging in politics as primarily a politician rather than a lawyer.
Chapter seventeen and eighteen deal with successes and
failures in the legal profession with brief biographical sketches
of successful lawyers and statesmen. Mr. Redfield draws the
conclusion that one common denominator shared by all was
the element of general good character, personality and perseverance. As to those who fall by the wayside, he finds
several reasons, such as: health and finances, lack of resolution, lack of aggressiveness, and those having unacceptance
traits or eccentricities. Confidence, self-assurance, and leadership are suggested as indispensable qualities for success.
Chapter nineteen is devoted to beginners. The question of
where and how to practice is raised. The suggestion put forth
is that an analysis ought to be made on the basis of social
and economic factors. Again the consideration of specialization is raised with the idea that one so interested might be
wise to seek employment in the desired area in order to be
able to offer such experience to a law firm. The author suggests that those who expect to establish a private practice
eventually take the plunge immediately on completing law
school. He concludes the chapter stressing the need to work
diligently, act with dignity, and above all to know the "Rules
of Evidence."
In the final chapter Mr. Redfield ponders the need of
maintaining a balance among all activities in order to lead
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a vital and happy life. He suggests the need for physical activity and adaptability to worry so that a lawyer may continue
to do his best.
My conclusion after reading Mr. Redfield's book is that
it is to be recommended to those lawyers who have been in
practice only a few years, to those lawyers just beginning
practice and to those persons soon to become lawyers. The
book does provide a valuable insight into many aspects of
and circumstances relating to the legal profession perhaps
not often considered.
ROBERT P. GUST

